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Pursuant

to

Rule

26(a),

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, Appellants Pacificorp Electric Operation and Aetna
Health Plans submit this Reply Brief in response to the arguments
raised by Appellee Ann Anastasion in her Brief.
I.

RELEVANT FACTS.
Appellee Ann Anastasionfs Brief sets forth numerous facts

regarding her subjective intent in making the Offer of Judgment.
These facts, many of which have absolutely no evidentiary support
in the record, are not relevant under Utah law in deciding the
chief issue before this Court:

whether there was a binding

agreement between the parties when Pacificorp and Aetna accepted
Ann Anastasion!s Offer of Judgment that was hand-served on them and
did not specify or limit which adverse party could accept it.
When the proper legal standards and issues are addressed,
there are relatively few relevant facts in this appeal and they are
as follows:
1.

Merle Allred

initially

brought this negligence

action against Appellee Ann Anastasion for injuries suffered on Ms.
Anastasion!s property.
2.

(Record pp. 2-5).

Appellants Pacificorp Electric Operation and Aetna

Health Plans were brought into this action by Original Plaintiff's
amended complaint.
3.

(Record pp. 57-60).

Pacificorp Electric Operation and Aetna Health Plans

became an adverse party to Appellee Ann Anastasion by filing a
crossclaim for reimbursement of medical expenses they had paid to
Original

Plaintiff as a result of Appellee Ann Anastasionfs

(hereinafter "Crossclaim Defendant") negligence. (Record pp. 7277).

Pacificorp

Electric

Operation

and

Aetna

Health

Plans

(hereinafter collectively "Crossclaim Plaintiffs") also claimed
interest on this sum, and their costs and attorneys fees. (Record
pp. 72-77).
4.

On June 30, 1993, Crossclaim Defendant filed a

motion and memorandum attempting to have Crossclaim Plaintiffs
dropped from the lawsuit or, in the alternative, to have the
parties realigned to more accurately reflect Crossclaim Plaintiffs'
interests as a Plaintiff.
5.

(Record pp. 105-110).

On July 27, 1993 Crossclaim Defendant served by

hand-de1ivery on Crossclaim Plaintiffs a Rule 68(b) offer of
judgment.

(Record pp. 135-138).

By its terms, that offer of

judgment was to be open and available to be accepted for ten days.
(Record pp. 135-138).
6.

The Offer of Judgment Crossclaim Defendant hand-

served on Crossclaim Plaintiffs provided, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Defendant Ann Anastasion, by and through her
attorney, offers to allow judgment to be taken against it
in the amount of Seventeen Thousand Five Hundred and
No/100 Dollars ($17,500) together with costs presently
accrued.
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, this offer will remain open and available to
be accepted for ten (10) days.
If not accepted in
writing within that time period it will be deemed
rejected and withdrawn and Defendant Ann Anastasion
intends to introduce it in order to recover costs
incurred.
(Record pp. 135-138).
2

7.

On July 29, 1993, well within the 10-day acceptance

period, Crossclaim Plaintiffs accepted Crossclaim Defendants1 Offer
of Judgment by sending her a Notice of Acceptance of her Offer of
Judgment.

(Record pp. 145-156).

Further, in compliance with Utah

R. Civ. P. 68(b), Crossclaim Plaintiffs filed with the lower court
both the Offer of Judgment and Notice of Acceptance together with
proof of service.

(Record pp. 135-138, 145-146). All of this was

done before Crossclaim Defendant made any indication that she had
any objection to Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 accepting her Offer of
Judgment.

In accordance with Crossclaim Plaintiffs acceptance of

her Offer of Judgment, the lower court entered judgment against
Crossclaim Defendant on August 4, 1993.

(Record pp. 190-198, 219-

225).
8.

On

September

28,

1993

the

lower

court, upon

Crossclaim Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment vacated the
judgment against Crossclaim Defendant which was based on Crossclaim
Plaintiffs' acceptance of the Offer of Judgment.
370).

(Record pp. 361-

The lower court, in making that ruling, did not take any

testimony or evidence other than a single affidavit by Crossclaim
Defendant's counsel which is discussed infra at pp. 6-7 and is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
Based on these relevant facts, it is clear that under
Utah law Crossclaim Plaintiffs had the power to accept Crossclaim
Defendant's Offer of Judgment and that acceptance created a legally
binding agreement that should be enforced.

3

II.

THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT CROSSCLAIM DEFENDANT'S
PERSONAL SERVICE VIA HAND-DELIVERY ON CROSSCLAIM
PLAINTIFFS OF A RULE 68 OFFER OF JUDGMENT THAT NEITHER
SPECIFIES NOR LIMITS WHO CAN ACCEPT THE OFFER DID NOT
CREATE THE POWER OF ACCEPTANCE IN CROSSCLAIM PLAINTIFFS
IS REVIEWED UNDER A CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARD.
The issue of whether or not a power of acceptance was

created in Crossclaim Plaintiffs by Crossclaim Defendant's Offer of
Judgment raises a question of law and the standard of review is a
correction of error standard.1

E.g., Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v.

Ouintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Whether a contract
exists between parties is a question of law; therefore, we review
the trial court's conclusion of law under a correction of error
standard.");

Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah Ct. App.),

cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
Crossclaim Defendant argues that because the lower court
made "findings of fact" in striking the Crossclaim Plaintiffs'
acceptance of the Offer of Judgment it somehow changes the nature
of this Court's standard of review to the abuse of discretion
standard.

That is not the case.

Where, as here, the lower court

makes its determinations based solely upon proffers and pleadings,
and does not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, the appellate
court "has as good an opportunity as the trial court to examine the
evidence and may review the facts de novo." Bench v. Bechtel Civil
& Minerals, Inc. , 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see also
Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)(when lower court does not resort to extrinsic
1

There is no dispute as to the standards of review
applicable to the two remaining issues involved in this appeal.
4

evidence the lower court's decision is not afforded any presumption
of correctness). Additionally, several of the purported "findings
of fact" are actually conclusions of law and, as such, are accorded
no deference.

For instance, "finding of fact" number two finds

that the Offer of Judgment was never made nor extended to
Crossclaim Plaintiffs. That is based solely on the language of the
actual Offer of Judgment and that construction is a matter of law.
Likewise

number

8, which

finds

that

Crossclaim

Plaintiffs1

subjective belief that the Offer of Judgment was made to them was
not reasonable, is also a conclusion of law. Numbers 9 and 10 are
also conclusions of law. Thus, in addition to the findings of fact
being based solely on pleadings and other evidence (or no evidence
at all), many of the "findings of fact" are actually conclusions of
law which are also reviewed under the correction of standard.
E.g. , Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Ouintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992);

State in Interest of J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah
r

Ct. App. 1994).
In deciding the first issue on appeal, the lower court
did not take any testimony or have the opportunity to review the
credibility of any witnesses.

The only "evidence" even arguably

supporting the lower court's "findings of facts" is the selfserving,

conclusory,

after-the-fact

Defendant's own counsel.

affidavit

of

Crossclaim

(See Record pp. 210-212, a copy of which

is attached hereto as Exhibit "A").

That affidavit, however,

clearly does not support findings of fact numbers 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8

5

and 9, and there is no record evidence which does.2

Thus, this

Court should look to the pleadings in the record and review the
lower court's ruling under the correction of error standard. E.g.,
Bench, 758 P.2d at 461; Equitable, 849 P.2d at 1192.
THE CROSSCLAIM PLAINTIFFS1 ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER OF
JUDGMENT WAS VALID AND BINDING, AND ENFORCEMENT OF THAT
ACCEPTANCE IS REQUIRED BY THE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE, UTAH
CONTRACT LAW, AND RULE 68 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

III.

The four arguments Crossclaim Defendant raises against
enforcement

of

the

judgment

based

on Crossclaim Plaintiffs1

acceptance of Crossclaim Defendant's Offer of Judgment are wrong as
a matter of law, procedure and evidence.

Each argument will be

addressed in turn.
A.

THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS CREATING A LEGALLY
BINDING AGREEMENT WHICH THIS COURT SHOULD ENFORCE.

The first argument raised by the Crossclaim Defendant in
hopes the Court will not enforce the binding agreement between the
parties is that there was no meeting of the minds.3

Their

argument, however, completely ignores Utah law, as set forth fully
in Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 initial brief, which requires that mutual
assent be measured by the objective evidence of the parties1

2

This also explains the Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 alleged
failure to marshal the evidence. Given that there is no record
evidence to support the lower court's findings of fact, there is no
duty as it would be impossible to marshal evidence which does not
exist.
3

The third argument is very similar to the first in that
it says Crossclaim Plaintiffs have failed to show there was a
meeting of the minds. This argument, like the first argument, is
unavailing because there was a meeting of the minds under Utah law.
See infra at pp. 7-12.
6

intentions.

Under that standard, there is no doubt that there was

a legally binding agreement this Court should enforce.
Utah law is clear that it is the objective, expressed
intention that determines whether there was mutual assent to create
a legally, binding agreement:
The apparent mutual assent of the parties, essential to
the formation of a contract, must be gathered by the
language employed by them, and the law imputes to a
person an intention corresponding to the reasonable
meaning of its words and acts.
It judges of his
intentions by his outward expressions and excludes all
guestions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his
words or acts judged by reasonable standards manifests an
intention to agree to the matter in guestion, that
agreement is established and it is immaterial what may be
the real but unexpressed state of his mind upon the
subject.
Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah
1983)(emphases added)(guoting Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah
226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923)).
Moreover, Crossclaim Defendant's own cases recognize tat
the extrinsic evidence such as the language of the contract, and
not some unexpressed reservation or intention, is determinative of
whether there was a meeting of the minds.

E.g., John Call

Engineering v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987)(in
determining mutual assent the intention of the parties to a
contract are controlling and those intentions are usually found in
the instrument itself);

Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386

4

In fact, Crossclaim Defendant's brief argues the exact
opposite (i.e., her subjective, unexpressed intent was such that
Crossclaim Plaintiffs could not accept her offer of judgment and,
thus, there could be no meeting of the minds).
See Brief of
Appellee at p. 17. Not only is such a statement self-serving and
conclusory, it is also irrelevant under Utah law as discussed
below.
7

(Utah 1987) (same); Zions First Nat'l Bank v, Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031,
1033 (Utah 1977)(language of agreement demonstrates intentions of
parties).
The objective evidence showing that there was a mutual
assent between the parties is extensive and begins with the
Crossclaim Defendant's Offer of Judgment that was hand-de 1 ivered to
Crossclaim Plaintiff and provided:
Pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Defendant Ann Anastasion, by and through her
attorney, offers to allow judgment to be taken against it
in the amount of Seventeen Thousand Five Hundred and
No/100 Dollars ($17,500) together with costs presently
accrued.
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, this offer will remain open and available to
be accepted for ten (10) daysIf not accepted in
writing within that time period it will be deemed
rejected and withdrawn and Defendant Ann Anastasion
intends to introduce it in order to recover costs
incurred.
(Record pp. 135-138).
An offer such as the foregoing is controlled by the
express intention of the offeror. See Corbin on Contracts, Section
11,

at 25

(1963).

The

clear and

unexpressed

intention of

Crossclaim Defendants1 Offer of Judgment was to allow Crossclaim
Plaintiff or Original Plaintiff (upon whom the Offer was also handdelivered), or both, to take judgment against her or risk the
potential of paying the post-offer costs incurred by Crossclaim
Defendant. The language of the offer, therefore, leads to but one
conclusion:

Crossclaim Defendant's Offer of Judgment was "a

manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to
justify

[Crossclaim Plaintiffs] in understanding that
8

[their]
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reflect

[Crossclaim

See Brief of Appellee at

In fact, Crossclaim Defendant has

had the audacity to claim that Crossclaim Plaintiffs are bound by
an order directed solely to the Original Plaintiff because of this
alignment with the Original Plaintiff.

See Exhibit "B" attached

hereto at p. 2. Crossclaim Defendant, thus, clearly recognized at
the time the Offer of Judgment was made that Crossclaim Plaintiffs
were an adverse party and, pursuant to Rule
Plaintiffs

had

the

power

and

properly

68, Crossclaim

accepted

Crossclaim

Defendants1 Offer of Judgment.
Crossclaim Defendant also attempts to explain away its
service of the Offer of Judgment on Crossclaim Plaintiffs by handdelivery. Although it is true that service is required under Rule
5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is highly suspect that she
would

choose

to

personally

serve

the

Offer

of

Judgment on

Crossclaim Plaintiffs if she truly in fact did not intend to make
the offer available to them.

More importantly, it certainly

created the objective appearance that the Offer of Judgment was
being presented for Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 acceptance.

Thus,

Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 acceptance of that Offer of Judgment was
entirely

reasonable,

appropriate

and

the

judgment

resulting

therefrom should be enforced.
5

The Crossclaim Defendant's Brief repeatedly refers to
this motion as a motion to "dismiss Crossclaim Plaintiff from the
lawsuit."
This is misleading as Crossclaim Defendant was also
expressly seeking to realign Crossclaim Plaintiffs as a Plaintiff
to more accurately reflect their interests in this action.
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The lower court's purported -j.xndings of fact" also do
not assist Crossclaim Defendant in this regard. The only finding
the court made was that the Crossclaim Plaintiffs 1 outlays were
less than the $17,500, it did not address the amounts they may have
been entitled to as a result of interest, costs and attorney f s
fees.
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contract.

Supporting that claim, she cited Ingram v. Forrer, 563

P.2d 181 (Utah 1987).7

Ingram, however, enforced an agreement

according to its terms and not the unexpressed agreements or
intentions of the party.

Id. at 182.

Here, like in Ingram, the

express provisions of the offer to contract which was accepted
defines the terms of the parties1 agreement and that agreement must
be enforced.
The strict construction of the offer is particularly
appropriate where a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment is involved:
To allow a Rule 68 offeror to inject
ambiguities into its offer after the fact
would be tantamount to requiring the offeree
to guess what meaning a Court will give to the
terms of that offer before deciding whether to
accept it or not. . . . Because [the rule 68
offeree is bound to pay post-offer costs if he
does not unreservedly accept the offer, ] he is
entitled to construe the offer's terms
strictly, and Courts should be reluctant to
allow the offerorfs extrinsic evidence to
affect that construction.
Said v. Virginia Com. Univ./Medical College, 130 F.R.D. 60, 63
(E.D. Va. 1990)(citations omitted).
Thus, Crossclaim Defendant's failure to limit the offer to only a
particular adverse party (which she easily could have done) must be
construed against her and the ambiguity she created should not be
7

Crossclaim Defendant's reliance on Seare v. University of
Utah School of Med. , 248 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9-10 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) is also misplaced. In Seare, the Court held that appellant
could not enforce a contract because his unexpressed intentions
could not constitute a meeting of the minds. While that is true,
it is the exact opposite to the situation here where Crossclaim
Defendant incorrectly asserts that her unexpressed intentions
preclude a meeting of the minds. Moreover, Seare is cited in
direct violation of Rule 4-508, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, which prohibits the citation to unpublished
opinions.
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Thus,

rimrlified

As s u c h , a f i n d i n g *

.1 III lr|im in ni I:

f"! p a t eel

acceptance in Crossclaim Plaintiffs is entirely consistent with and
furthers the purposes of Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
IV.

THE LOWER COURT'S RULING SETTING ASIDE THE AUGUST 4, 1993
JUDGMENT WAS ERROR UNDER UTAH LAW AND THAT RULING SHOULD
BE REVERSED.
The lower court based its decision to set aside the

judgment entered against the Crossclaim Defendant on mistake.
(Record at p. 323, 935-953)^

That decision was manifest error and

should be reversed.
The only evidence from which the lower court could derive
the intent of the Crossclaim Defendant in making her Offer of
Judgment was

the actual

offer which, by

its terms and the

applicable procedural rules, created a power of acceptance in
Crossclaim Plaintiffs.

Thus, there is no legal justification for

setting aside the judgment that was entered based on Crossclaim
Plaintiffs1 acceptance of the Offer of Judgment. The lower court's
setting aside of that judgment amounts to an abrogation of the
contract entered into the parties pursuant to Rule 68, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
The bases for the lower court's setting aside of the
judgment are nothing more than an after-the-fact attempt to change
or limit the Offer of Acceptance after it has been accepted.

The

law does not allow this. E.g., Blair v. Shanahan, 795 F.Supp. 309,
315-316 (N.D.Cal. 1992).

As the Blair court noted, the power of

Rule 68 should not be increased "by allowing an offer that had been
accepted to be revised to reflect post-acceptance changes in the
14
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Original Plaintiff.
Utah law is clear that where, as here, there are no
"additional" costs incurred as a result of joining another party,
any assessed costs should be assessed solely against the original
opposing party(Utah 1978).

Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe. 576 P.2d 847, 849

In this case, all of the costs awarded by the lower

court related solely to claims raised by Original Plaintiff.
Moreover, some of the costs were incurred even before Crossclaim
Plaintiffs became parties to this action. Thus, under Utah law, it
was error for the lower court to fail to assess all costs solely
against Original Plaintiff and the judgment assessing costs against
the Crossclaim Plaintiffs should be modified as such.
VI.

CROSSCLAIM PLAINTIFFS APPEAL HAS MERIT AND WAS NOT
INTERPOSED FOR ANY IMPROPER PURPOSE.
Crossclaim Defendant's argument that this appeal lacks

merit or was interposed for some improper purpose is entirely
untenable.

Not only do the Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 briefs clearly

demonstrate that their position has merit, the Utah Supreme Court
has denied a Motion for Summary Disposition previously made by
Crossclaim Defendant on this appeal. There is absolutely no basis
upon which it could be found that Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 appeal is
anything but meritorious and proper.
VII.

CONCLUSION.
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 68(b) the Court, as a matter

of law, should direct the lower court to reinstate judgment against
8

This issue, obviously, becomes moot if the Court rules in
Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 favor on either of the two other issues.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed, postage prepaid, this |Oth day of
January, 1995 to the following:
Steven B. Smith
SCALLEY & READING
261 E. 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendants-Crossdefendants
Ann Anastasion and Shawn Anastasion
Kelly R. Sheffield
1364 Emigration Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Attorney for Plaintiff-Counterdefendant
Merle Lee Allred
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JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4590
STEVEN B. SMITH, #5797
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendant
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801). 531-7870
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MERLE LEE ALLRED,

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN B. SMITH

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 910906462PI
ANN ANASTASION and SHAWN
ANASTASION,
Defendants.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson
:

Steven B. Smith, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and says:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the

state of Utah.
2.

I am the attorney for Defendant Ann Anastasion in

this action.
3.

Numerous attempts have been made by counsel for

Defendant, Ann Anastasion, and Plaintiff, Merle Lee Allred, to
negotiate a settlement to this dispute.

C:\SBS\PLEADING\ANASTAS.MIS

4.

On July 27, 1993, I, as the attorney for Defendant

Ann Anastasion, prepared, filed and served an Offer of Judgment on
counsel for Plaintiff Merle Lee Allred in an attempt to fully and
finally resolve this dispute.
5.

On July 30, 1993, I received a copy of Defendants

Aetna's and PacifiCorp's acceptance of the Offer of Judgment which
was submitted for Plaintiff's Merle Lee Allred's acceptance.
6.

Upon

receipt

of

that

purported

acceptance

of

Defendant Ann Anastasion's Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff Merle Lee
Allred,

I contacted

Blake Atkin, the attorney

for Aetna and

PacifiCorp and informed him that the Offer of Judgment had been
made to Plaintiff and not to PacifiCorp and Aetna and that we would
refuse to recognize his purported acceptance of the offer of
Judgment.
7.

On August 4, 1993, I had hand delivered a letter to

Blake Atkin setting forth our position regarding Defendants

C:\SBS\PLEA0ING\ANASTAS.HIS

2

PacifiCorp/s and Aetna's acceptance of Defendant Ann Anastasion's
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff, Merle Lee Allred.
DATED this

day of August, 1993.
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendant

<S^x:^/

Steven B. Smith

is J
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

w

day of

August, 1993.
Notary

My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC

TERRYJ.NOYD
2«1 East 300 S o u * MOO
SaMUteCNy.UMIl 04111

MyCmunlllleHEiptf—
JWWS0.10N

•TATS OV UTAH

C:\SBS\PLEADING\ANASTAS.MIS

P u b l i c V U

Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
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JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4590
STEVEN B. SMITH, #5797
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendant
Sean Anastasion
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MERLE LEE ALLRED,

:
:

SEAN ANASTASION'S RESPONSE TO
AETNA' S OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

:

Civil No. 910906462PI

ANN ANASTASION, SEAN
ANASTASION, PACIFICORP
ELECTRIC OPERATION AND AETNA
HEALTH PLANS

:

Plaintiff,

:
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
Sean Anastasion, by and through counsel, hereby submits
this Response to Aetna's Objections the Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law submitted in conjunction with this Court's
decision to set aside the Default and Default Judgments entered
against Sean Anastasion.

Throughout this Response Third Party

Plaintiffs Aetna and Pacificorp are collectively referred to as
Aetna.
Aetna claims the Court did not order Sean to be served
prior to the entry of his Default and the Default Judgment against

him.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is this Court's Minute Entry

dated June 15, 1993, which among other things states "PLAINTIFF HAS
10 DAYS TO FILE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE AGAINST DEFENDANT, SEAN
ANASTATION [sic] IF HE HAS BEEN SERVED. IF HE HAS NOT BEEN SERVED,
COUNSEL IS TO SERVE HIM." While the term plaintiff in the forgoing
quotation could refer only to Merle Allred, counsel's memory and
the other facts and circumstances indicate the term "plaintiff" in
the Minute Entry referred to Third Party Plaintiffs Aetna and
Pacificorp.
with

its

The fact that Aetna actually served Sean Anastasion

Crossclaim

after

the Minute

Entry

supports

Sean's

position. Further support for Sean's position is that Blake Atkin,
the attorney for Aetna, is identified on the Minute Entry as
Plaintiff's attorney.

Sean Anastasion submits and continues to

assert that Aetna was ordered to see that Sean was served prior to
entry of his default and the default judgment against him.
Sean's response to Aetna's objection to the proposed
finding of fact 14 rests on the language of the Special Verdict
filled out by the Jury Foreperson and filed with this Court on
February 9# 1994.

A copy of that Special Verdict is attached

hereto as Exhibit "B."
Paragraph 3 of that Special Verdict states " [c]onsidering
all the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant, Sean Anastasion, was negligent?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

"

2

In response to the question in paragraph 3 the jury foreperson
marked "No."

While Aetna contends it did not put on its best

possible case against Sean Anastasion it has neglected to set forth
with specificity anything different it would have done. Aetna has
likewise totally ignored the fact that it was totally at fault for
the improper entry of the Default and Default Judgment which
prevented Sean from participating in the trial and allegedly
resulted in Aetna putting on its impotent case.

While issues of

res judicata and collateral estoppel will have to be resolved at a
different time, the jury's finding is the jury's finding and it
found "from a preponderance of the evidence that [Sean] was [not]
negligent."
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order are
consistent with the facts and the findings of this Court and should
be signed as submitted.
DATED THIS f U day of November, 1994.
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Sean Anastasion

BY: Steven B.
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of November, 1994,

true and correct copies of Sean's Response to Aetna's Objections to

3

the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were
deposited in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to
the following:
Kelly R. Sheffield
1364 Emigration
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Blake S. Atkin
50 South Main Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Kchuy, ^Jptd C ^ ^
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EXHIBIT "A"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
ALLRED, MERLE LEE
PLAINTIFF
VS
ANASTATION, ANNA

CASE NUMBER 910906462 PI
DATE 06/15/93
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R HANSON
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK EVT

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

P. ATTY. SHEFFIELD, KELLY, BLAKE ATKIN
D. ATTY. SMITH, STEVEN B

PER TELEPHONE CONFERENCE,
1. DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL IS TO FILE ANY MOTION TO EXCLUDE
ETNA INSURANCE FROM PARTICIPATION IN TRIAL WITHIN 15 DAYS.
\ 2 . PLAINTIFF HAS 10 DAYS TO FILE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE
AGAINST DEFENDANT, SEAN ANASTATION IF HE HAS BEEN SERVED. IF HE
HAS NOT BEEN SERVED, COUNSEL IS TO SERVE HIM.
3. REGARDING QUESTION RAISED BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO
AMEND THE COMPLAINT, THE COURT WILL NOT ALLOW ANY FURTHER
AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPLAINT.

EXHIBIT "B"

Third Judicial District

FEB-9

m

COUNTY

ttf&Obmr
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MERLE LEE ALLRED,

SPECIAL VERDICT
CASE NO. 910906462

Plaintiff,
vs.
ANNE ANASTASION, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of
the evidence.

If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of

the issue presented, then answer "yes."

If you find the evidence

is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of
the evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates*
against the issue presented, answer "no."

Also, any damages

assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find

from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Anne
Anastasion, was negligent?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

^

If your answer to Question No. 1 is "yes," please answer
Question No. 2.

-2-

2.

Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find

from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the
defendant, Anne Anastasion, was either the sole proximate cause or
a contributing proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries?
ANSWER:
3.

Yes

No @ >

Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find

from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Sean
Anastasion, was negligent?
ANSWER:

Yes

No A

If your answer to Question No. 3 is "yes," please answer
Question No. 4.
4.

Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find

from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the
defendant, Shawn Anastasion, was either the sole proximate cause or
a contributing proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

If you have answered Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 all "no," or
were not required to answer Question 2 or 4, you need not go
further in answering additional questions. Please sign the verdict
form and notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to the
courtroom.

If you have found negligence on the part of either or

both of the defendants, and that negligence was a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries, then please proceed to the next
question.

-35.

Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find

from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff, Merle Allred,
was negligent?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

If your answer to Question No* 5 is "yes/ 1 please answer
Question No. 6.
6.

Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find

from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the
plaintiff, Merle Allred, was either the sole proximate cause or a
contributing proximate cause of her own injuries?
ANSWER:
!•

Yes

No

Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total

100%, what percentage of fault is attributable to:
A.

Defendant Anne Anastasion

%

B.

Defendant Sean Anastasion

%

C.

Plaintiff Merle Allred

%

TOTAL
8.

100

%

Please state the amount of special and general damages,

if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of
plaintiff's injuries.
Special Damages
(a) medical expenses to date of trial
(b) future medical expenses

$
$

the

-4-

General Damages (pain & suffering)
TOTAL
Dated this f

dav of Fe^ruaryr

FOREPERSON
'fe/OT L OU><2

$.

